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DEDICATION
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS
The editors of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review dedicate
the law review’s inaugural Supreme Court issue to Justice John Paul
Stevens, upon his retirement from the bench and in honor of his
incredible and lasting contributions to the legal community. The
issue includes dedication letters from President Bill Clinton, Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Justice Sonia Sotomayor, as well as
dedication letters and essays written by Justice Stevens’ former
clerks Susan R. Estrich, Michael J. Gottlieb, Abner S. Greene, Jamal
Greene, Melissa Hart, Amanda Leiter, Gregory P. Magarian, Nancy
S. Marder, David Pozen, Adam M. Samaha, and Samuel Spital.
***
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My sincere thanks to each of my former colleagues for your
kind words and, more importantly, for your superb contributions to
the work of the Court.
Sincerely,
John Paul Stevens
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President Bill Clinton
Capturing the essence of any career in a handful of paragraphs is
never simple. The accumulated disappointments and triumphs would
provide the underpinnings of an epic novel. When the subject has
served an extraordinary three and a half decades on the nation’s
highest court, the challenge would seem to be all the greater.
The task is actually easier with Justice John Paul Stevens
because he has written his own way into history. His opinions,
whether for the majority in concurrence or in sometimes scathing
dissent, are free of bombast and five-dollar words. They provide a
clear view of the philosophy he applied to the cases before him, and
what he believed to be their historical significance.
That the third-longest serving justice in the history of the Court
would turn out to be one of its most gifted legal writers was no
surprise to anyone who was paying attention in the fall of 1975. A
Time magazine article on Gerald Ford’s nomination of Stevens
wrapped up with a glowing admiration from Philip Kurland, the
University of Chicago's constitutional expert. Kurland, who had little
patience for sloppily-written legal opinions, seemed nearly giddy at
the prospect of a new justice who could write well.
At the time of the Stevens nomination, I was a young law
professor at the University of Arkansas Law School at Fayetteville. I
had been recommended for the job by my Corporate and Tax Law
professor at Yale, in spite of the fact that he had once reprimanded
me for reading Gabriel Garcia Marquez’ One Hundred Years of
Solitude in class instead of focusing on his lecture. While I should
have been, like Kurland, paying closer attention to the nomination, at
least I was an unapologetic fan of great writing.
After the recent storm over President Ford’s pardon of Richard
Nixon, I, like much of the country, briefly noted with appreciation
Stevens’ considerable qualifications and left it at that. The Senate
was similarly impressed, and confirmed him quickly, and by a
margin of 98–0.
That vote of confidence proved to be fully justified. Over the
next thirty-five years, John Paul Stevens, in his questions from the
bench and in his written opinions, gave a voice to those without a
platform of their own: the ordinary citizens, the underrepresented,
the victims of bigotry, the prisoners and the pariahs, and he did so in

816

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:813

words full of clarity and conviction.
Although Justice Stevens evolved in stark contrast to the
rightward push of the Court’s conservative majority, he maintained
an impressive ability to frame coalitions around practical, commonsense positions. When he couldn’t bridge the divide, he dissented in
opinions that were combative and, I believe, prophetic. The boy who
witnessed Babe Ruth’s famous “called shot” in the 1932 World
Series never hesitated to call them the way he saw them.
Justice Stevens’ opinions are never loosely reasoned or
decorated with affected prose. Like all great writers, he brings clarity
to the indistinct and resolution to the tenuous. A jurist who can do
this strengthens the foundations of our democracy, and assures even
more firmly our rights for future generations.
A good illustration of Justice Stevens’ special talent is his
famous dissent—later vindicated by the ruling’s reversal—in Bowers
v. Hardwick:
“Although the meaning of the principle that ‘all men are
created equal’ is not always clear, it surely must mean that
every free citizen has the same interest in ‘liberty’ that the
members of the majority share.”
You can hardly imagine a more clear affirmation of another
brilliant legal writer, working in seclusion in June of 1776. Like
Thomas Jefferson, Justice Stevens labored long and well to ensure
that the rights his words described were extended to all citizens and
would continue to be after he ended his service.
I am honored to join with the distinguished faculty and
administration of the Loyola University of Los Angeles Law School
in dedicating this special issue of the Law Review to the career and
jurisprudence of Justice John Paul Stevens. I hope that those of us
who contributed to it have done justice to his ideas, his eloquence,
his way of making decisions and writing them down in clear, strong
language. Justice Stevens’ special qualities are gifts for which we
should be grateful and which we all should strive to emulate.
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Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg*
Five years ago, in a letter applauding Justice Stevens’ 30-year
tenure on the Court, President Gerald Ford commented that Supreme
Court nominations are seldom considered when historians assess
Presidencies.1 “Let that not be the case with my Presidency,” Ford
continued, “[f]or I am prepared to allow history’s judgment of my
term in office to rest (if necessary, exclusively) on my
nomination . . . of Justice John Paul Stevens to the U.S. Supreme
Court.”2 Legions of lawyers and judges would concur heartily in
President Ford’s praise for the “dignity, intellect[,] and [absence of]
partisan political concerns”3 that characterized Justice Stevens’
service on the Court.
Expressing my affection and admiration for my dear colleague, I
wrote to Justice Stevens on the day he told us of his decision to
retire:
You are the very best of jurists, and I will so miss your
bright company. From my first year [at the Court], you have
been my model of how a collegial judge should behave.
Work from other chambers invariably took precedence over
all else on your agenda. I could not match the immediacy of
your responses to circulating opinions, but I have tried to be
a respectful second.4
“Humility, not haughtiness,” one of Justice Stevens’ law clerks
observed, “marked his career on the Court.”5 In a Capital City with
no shortage of self promoters, Justice Stevens set a different tone.
Quick as his bright mind is, and fluent as his pen (or keyboard) is in
drafting opinions, Justice Stevens remains a genuinely gentle and
modest man. No jurist with whom I have served was more dedicated
to the judicial craft, more open to what he called “learning on the
* Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States.
1. President Ford’s letter is quoted in William Michael Treanor, Introduction to Symposium
on the Jurisprudence of Justice Stevens, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1557, 1559 (2006).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Letter on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review.
5. Diane Marie Amann, John Paul Stevens, Human Rights Judge, 74 FORDHAM L. REV.
1569, 1569 (2006).
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job,”6 more sensitive to the well being of the community law exists
to serve.
His manner at oral argument typified both his civility and the
quality of his mind. He preceded his questions with the politest “May
I, . . .,” then invited advocates to train their attention sharply on the
precise issue likely to be dispositive.
Justice Stevens was not given to stock formulas that sometimes
obscure the true basis for a Court’s decision. He insisted that
analysis, not habit, should inform the Court’s judgments.7 His
opinions, sometimes prophetic, often pathmarking, will continue to
challenge and inspire jurists for generations to come.

6. John Paul Stevens, Learning on the Job, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1561 (2006).
7. See, e.g., Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 222 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring in the
judgment) (“It is fair to infer that habit, rather than analysis or actual reflection, made it seem
acceptable to equate the terms ‘widow’ and ‘dependent surviving spouse.’”).
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Justice Sonia Sotomayor*
Justice John Paul Stevens: Teaching By Example
Working with Justice Stevens is among the most profound
experiences of my career. And his retirement from the Court is one
of the saddest. I feel fortunate beyond words to have spent almost a
year working with this great man. He was most welcoming when I
arrived at the Court, and through our conversations and other
opportunities to observe him at work, I learned things that cannot be
taught except by example.
Almost everyone to describe Justice Stevens remarks
immediately on his decency and humility. It is no wonder, as he
possesses each of these traits in unusual abundance. But this
description does not begin to capture the complexities of the Justice’s
character or the depth of his work.
As his opinions show, there seemingly is no subject that does
not interest Justice Stevens. And certainly there is none that he
cannot master. This is as true of non-legal subjects as it is of legal
ones. Consider that this man who lived through prohibition and the
advent of television was one of the first Justices to comprehend the
operation and significance of the Internet. And his understanding of
electioneering in the age of political action committees is arguably
unsurpassed.
Perhaps more striking than his command of the law is the
Justice’s indomitable sense of fairness. Despite all his years working
in such a grand building removed from so much of society, Justice
Stevens never lost sight of what some might consider smaller causes.
To him, unfairness or injustice even on an individual scale seemed
always to merit serious consideration. It is often said that the U.S.
Supreme Court is not a court of error correction. But that is not
entirely true, and Justice Stevens had a particular instinct for
identifying those errors that warranted further review even absent a
circuit split, a large amount in controversy, or the involvement of a
public figure.
The Justice never told me so directly, but I sensed that his
attention to these cases was in part a response to his view of the
* Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States. Justice Sotomayor gratefully
acknowledges the assistance of her 2009 Term law clerk, Lindsey Powell.

820

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:813

Court’s role in our society. He seemed to treat the protection of
individual rights granted by the Constitution as a sacred obligation of
our courts. His writings reflect a concern that, if the courts neglect
that obligation, it is uncertain whether other institutions would
respect those rights in their work, and our society would be the worse
for it.
In keeping with this commitment to the integrity of the courts,
Justice Stevens has been a lifelong devotee of the rule of law. He
built his professional reputation in large part on his representation of
the Greenberg Commission, which investigated allegations of
judicial misconduct by Illinois Supreme Court justices. The Justice’s
rigorous and fair approach to the investigation captured the public’s
attention and propelled his rise to the bench. Over the years, Justice
Stevens has remained loyal to these founding principles of his career.
Notably, the decisions of the Supreme Court with which the Justice
most adamantly disagreed are, by and large, those which he feared
would be perceived as being influenced by factors other than fidelity
to the rule of law.
In addition to his decency and humility, Justice Stevens is
widely known as a free thinker. Although long considered the leader
of the Court’s so-called liberal wing, in many cases the Justice did
not hesitate to stake out an opinion favored only by him or by one
other Justice. Whether due to his close reading of the facts, his
firsthand experience of the law’s evolution in an area, or a singular
approach to a legal doctrine, Justice Stevens often had a different
take, and he would not hesitate to say so. Famously, some of his
dissenting views became majorities over time, as seen in the Court’s
shift from Bowers v. Hardwick to Lawrence v. Texas. Even when
they have not carried the day, the Justice’s steady stream of separate
writings have challenged the other writers on the Court and
inevitably shaped their views.
It would be easy to underestimate the extent of this achievement.
In an institution that operates by reference to majorities and
traditions, the temptation to abandon individual efforts is substantial.
The Court’s extraordinarily heavy workload further augments the
allure of agreement. Justice Stevens’ intellectual advantages,
including his near-photographic memory, surely made the project of
writing separately somewhat easier for him. But it is no small feat to
remain faithful, year after year, to the project of going it alone.
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This fidelity to principle should not be confused with rigidity.
Quite the contrary. In remarks made at the Symposium on The
Jurisprudence of Justice Stevens, which was held at Fordham
University School of Law on September 30, 2005, Justice Stevens
described the ongoing learning process he engaged in while serving
on the bench. In part, the Justice was making a statement about the
relevance of certain types of questions during confirmation hearings.
But the Justice’s point was also a deeply personal one. Not only is
“learning on the job . . . essential to the process of judging,” he said,
it has also been “one of the most important and rewarding aspects of
[his] own experience over the last thirty-five years.” This was
evident to me even in the brief time Justice Stevens and I served
together. Although he never said so, I suspect that the Justice’s
unusually careful attention to the facts of each case—a practice that
others have so often noted—is part of what helped him to judge each
case only as it was presented and to learn as he went.
Work at the Court involves long hours spent poring over often
gruesome facts. For this reason, among others, one can imagine the
Court’s workload taking a toll over time. Yet, despite his unusually
long tenure as a Justice, there is no evidence that Justice Stevens felt
burdened or allowed himself to grow cynical. The Justice continued
to engage, with every appearance of fresh eyes and a buoyant spirit,
the facts of each case, and he would call attention to their
inconsistencies and injustices more often than any other member of
the Court.
Justice Stevens will continue to make substantial contributions
to the law in his retirement. He remains a tireless participant in legal
discourse, and the legacy of his decisions and his character will
always deeply impact the Court’s work. I know that I will routinely
return to his writings and example as I continue my own evolution as
a Justice.
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Susan R. Estrich*
A Lawyer on the Court
To be honest, I wasn’t entirely sure about Justice Stevens when I
first went to work as his law clerk, three decades ago. My first choice
was Justice Brennan but in those days, he didn’t hire women.
“Nothing personal,” I was told. Justice Stevens, having been on the
High Court all of one year and change at the time, seemed a tad
conservative to me: appointed by a Republican, opposed by the
National Organization for Women on the grounds that his opinions
on the Seventh Circuit (particularly in one case brought by
stewardesses) were insufficiently supportive of women’s rights. On
the other hand, at least he hired women.
Early on in my clerkship, the Justice explained his philosophy to
my co-clerk and me. In almost every case, he said, if you look hard
enough and think hard enough, there is a “right” answer. I could
barely keep a straight face. A “right” answer? What could be more
ridiculous? I had been taught—and not just by the critical legal
studies people who were then on-the-rise at Harvard—that it was all
politics, or values if you prefer, that you could argue almost anything
from one side or the other, and the “answer” was itself a choice. It
took me almost thirty years, and full-time practice for the last three,
to understand what Justice Stevens meant. Not surprisingly, he was
right.
To be sure, there are instances where the “law” could indeed go
either way, where, as a lawyer, you can honestly say that the chances
of winning are 50-50, or depend almost entirely (and only) on which
judge or judges are sitting in the room. But most of the time,
particularly in business litigation, that just isn’t the case. There is a
better answer, not a more liberal or conservative one, but one that
makes sense of a statutory scheme, serves the goals of that scheme,
reflects the concerns expressed in past opinions. Indeed, the rule of
law, by which I mean the system of treating like cases alike, and the
predictability which that allows to parties entering into contracts,
making deals, running businesses, depends on the law being
something much more than a coin toss.
* Clerk to Justice John Paul Stevens, October Term 1978. Robert Kingsley Professor of
Law and Political Science, USC Gould School of Law.
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Clerking for Justice Stevens was hard precisely because he
didn’t decide who should win before he had read the cases. His
judgments were made and opinions written with careful attention
both to how lower courts would understand them, and even more
perhaps, to how lawyers in practice could follow them. As he moved
from junior Justice to becoming, of all things, the senior “liberal” on
the Court, and got to assign himself opinions in more significant
cases (the senior Justice assigns when the Chief Justice is on the
dissenting side), the Justice’s determination to reach decisions and
write opinions that made “lawyerly” sense became even clearer. His
understanding that in law, as opposed to academics, facts really
matter, line-drawing is inevitable, and “reasonableness” can be a
standard that is more than a cover for political choices, infused his
opinions.
None of this might have mattered except for another lawyerly
trait—or at least a trait of the great lawyers I have worked with and
against. He believed in writing clearly. Simply. If you can’t say it
simply, he would tell us, it’s probably because you haven’t got the
argument right. A winning argument can be made in English; a
losing one requires legalese. His insistence on writing clearly went
hand-in-hand with his determination to find the “right” result,
because that result should be easy to explain and support by
reference to the words of the statute (say), the policies it serves, how
it has been interpreted in the past, and the like. If you were struggling
with an opinion, it was usually because there was something wrong
with the opinion; if it “wouldn’t write,” as we used to say, it was
probably because it shouldn’t. If you have to be glib to get by a
point, you probably haven’t figured the point out right. Glibness is
the last resort, the cover and not the answer.
I think about Justice Stevens a lot lately, as I supervise young
associates writing motions and briefs on a day-to-day basis. I think of
him when they come to me and give me an answer to a legal question
that just doesn’t seem, as he would say, “right”—that doesn’t make
sense of the statute, serve the goals it is supposed to serve, seem
consistent with the thrust of precedent, in other words, when the only
thing that would make it “right” is that it helps our client. “Is this
really the law?” I try to ask nicely, because it is obviously not our job
in practice to decide what the law is, but to argue for our client.
Usually it isn’t, which doesn’t mean you abandon your client, but
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that you need to find another approach, rather than trying to push a
sure loser up the hill. I think of him when I edit briefs with sentences
so long that I can’t follow them; I remember when I used to write
that way. Short sentences. Noun and verb. No flourishes. The
greatest compliment the Justice used to give us was that a draft was
simple, straightforward, easily followed and understood—and of
course, right.

***

Michael J. Gottlieb*
A Tribute to Justice Stevens
We have all received phone calls we will never forget. One of
mine took place eight years ago. It was on June 23, 2003, a date
some will associate with the announcement of significant equal
protection decisions,8 but which I will always remember as the date I
interviewed to clerk for Justice Stevens.
I was only about a month out of law school when I was invited
to interview with the Justice. I spent days poring over the Justice’s
opinions, reviewing legal commentary, and anticipating possible
questions. I barely slept out of a fear that I would appear unprepared.
In retrospect, I would have been far better off had I simply called my
family and studied the 1984 Chicago Cubs Playoffs roster. For, true
to form, the Justice did not grill me on legal doctrine; rather, he
focused on my upbringing, career aspirations, and interests outside of
the law, including my favorite baseball team.
When my phone rang later that afternoon, a voice instructed me
to hold for Justice Stevens. Before I could catch my breath, the
Justice came on the line and asked, “Mike, are you still interested in
* Clerk to Justice John Paul Stevens, October Term 2004. Special Assistant to the
President and Associate Counsel to the President. The views expressed herein are solely those of
the author in a personal capacity and do not reflect the views of any branch or agency of the
United States Government.
8. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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coming to work for me?” Having reassured him that my intent had
not changed since earlier that day, he offered me the job with one
caveat. “You can have the job,” he explained, “as long as you’re still
a Cubs fan.” I told him that could probably be arranged.
I had arrived at the Court on the morning of my interview
knowing only those things about the Justice that could be gleaned
from the public record. To be sure, I knew about his jurisprudence.
But I had also learned of his patriotism—he served as a Naval
cryptographer in World War Two; his brilliance—he received the
best grades in the history of Northwestern Law School; his
dedication to fitness—he had remained an accomplished golf and
tennis player well into his eighties; and his distinctive fashion
sense—he was the only Justice capable of pulling off his trademark
bow tie. My clerkship confirmed that the Justice possesses all of
those qualities in ample supply, yet they are not what I remember
most.
My fondest recollections are of working for a fundamentally
kind, modest, and decent human being. Justice Stevens always paid
attention to how we were doing and asked about our families. He
noticed when we were sick or tired. Once, perceiving two of us to be
sleep deprived, he utterly baffled us by offering to complete our cert
petition work so we could go to sleep. The Justice is well known for
signing “respectfully” at the end of every memo to his colleagues,
but he is even better known for the sincerity with which he uses the
word. Over the years, his colleagues have repeatedly praised his
unyielding collegiality. The Justice always gave credit to his
colleagues whose suggestions or criticisms helped improve his work.
Never once did his disagreements make him disagreeable, even when
confronting views that he described as “dead wrong.”
Over more than three decades on the Court, Justice Stevens
maintained a deliberately low public profile. I am partial to one
anecdote from our Term. On the eve of the 2004 Presidential
Election, my co-clerk and I stayed up late into the night monitoring
ongoing litigation in Ohio. As the Circuit Justice for the Sixth and
Seventh Circuits, Justice Stevens was called upon to decide a lastminute challenge relating to the presence of election monitors in
polling stations. We exchanged drafts by email into the morning. The
Justice’s opinion affirming the judgment below was released before
the polls opened the next day. When Justice Stevens went to vote

826

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:813

near his home in Virginia, he found himself in line behind a man
reading the newspaper. The man turned around, looked at the Justice,
and said, “Did you see what the Supreme Court decided in the Ohio
election case?” Justice Stevens played dumb; the other man never
knew.
During his time on the Court, Justice Stevens avoided black-tie
galas, power lunches, and the speaking circuit. At the start of our
Term, the Justice gave a speech in which he bragged, tongue in
cheek, about his lavish summer during which he had read several
books and traveled to the “exotic locale” of Chicago.9 His typical
lunch consisted of a grapefruit enjoyed in the privacy of his office,
with his colleagues following arguments, or in the courtyard with his
clerks when the weather permitted. I will never forget when the
Justice returned from the second inauguration of President George
W. Bush in 2005. Of all things, he was fixated on the food at the
congressional luncheon. Apparently, the shellfish spread was out of
this world.
Those of us lucky enough to have clerked for “JPS” know that
he possesses more than raw brainpower. The Justice has never let go
of his love of legal practice, which he first honed as an antitrust
attorney in Chicago. Well into his twilight on the Court, the Justice
continued to craft the first drafts of all his opinions, to test rigorously
the strengths and weaknesses of the parties’ briefs both before and
during oral arguments, and to read and reread cases from volumes of
the United States Reports he would pull off the shelves in his office.
But beyond his work ethic, the Justice displayed a genuine interest in
the historical background to each case. It was not simply that he
wanted to learn the record—he was legitimately excited about
grasping the historical context that gave life to the particular dispute.
For example, it was not the debate over the constitutionality of a Ten
Commandments display that most attracted Justice Stevens’ attention
in Van Orden v. Perry.10 Rather, in our many conversations about the
case, the Justice returned most often to the unusual relationship
between movie director Cecil B. DeMille and the Fraternal Order of
Eagles, which had led to the original donation of the Ten

9. John Paul Stevens, What I Did This Summer, 18-OCT CBA REC., Oct. 2004, at 34, 35
(2004).
10. 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Commandments monument to the state of Texas. It was not that
discussions about the Establishment Clause bored the Justice—not at
all—he just he had more fun reading and talking about DeMille and
the Eagles.
Those of us within the Stevens clerk family have always known
his retirement was inevitable, though we would admit it only
reluctantly. The inevitability of his departure, however, has made it
no less easy to bear. We know that no one will be able to replicate
the manner in which he could dismantle an argument with just one
incisive question, which he always began with, “Might I just
ask . . . .” We suspect that the Court will miss the Justice’s
midwestern sensibilities, his unique perspective as the only
remaining Justice to have served in the military, and his ability to see
modern disputes in the context of the long arc of history. And, of
course, we lament that the era of the bow-tie Justice has finally
drawn to a close.
True to my promise, I remained a Cubs fan. Near the end of our
Term, to his great delight, the Justice was invited to throw out the
first pitch at a Cubs game at Wrigley Field, the same stadium at
which he watched Babe Ruth call his shot some seventy-three years
before. The Justice, unwilling to disappoint his hometown crowd,
decided to practice. And that is how, as my clerkship was in its final
days, I found myself having a catch with Justice John Paul Stevens in
the Supreme Court gymnasium. I did not attend the game. But I
believe that, just as sure as Babe Ruth called his shot, Justice Stevens
threw a strike.

***
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Abner S. Greene*
Dear Justice Stevens,
When I first met you, we talked about law and baseball. The
Court had just risen from OT 1985, and I was eager to chat with you
about your brilliant separate opinion in Bowsher v. Synar. But there
was that signed Chicago Cubs baseball on your desk, which was
somewhat of a distraction. I also recall saying near the end that this
might be my only chance to chat with a Supreme Court Justice, and
would it be okay if I asked you a question. You said sure, and we
talked a bit about what it was like to live in the world as a Supreme
Court Justice—whether people treated you differently, whether you
felt any restraints on where you could go and what you could do.
I’m sure you cited some, but one of my fondest memories of
clerking for you, starting a year later, was how important it was to
you to have a life apart from your work. Some mornings you would
come in from a tennis match with your archrival; some days we
would chat about your bridge game or something that happened with
the Cubs. (Probably not something good, usually :)) Since I play
tennis and bridge, and am a baseball fan, I found all of this pretty
thrilling. It made the work—the intense, wonderful, daily experience
of talking law—fit with the rest of life.
That integration of work and life not only made days and nights
in your chambers particularly resonant for me, but also (as I’ve come
to see) helped inform your jurisprudence. There is some debate about
the use of emotion or sympathy in judging, and your ability to strike
the perfect notes here is something to behold. Judging must be
disinterested but it need not be dispassionate; it must apply the law,
but it must not ignore facts. Especially in your eloquent writing
(sadly, often dissenting) about the rights of prisoners and about
capital punishment, you always remind us that the state wields
enormous power and must turn very square corners.
Your commitment to a jurisprudence of reasons—especially
demanding that the state act for legitimate reasons, singling out
neither friends nor enemies for specially favored or disfavored
treatment—strikes me as the model of judgment. I believe that all of
us who worked for you try to emulate that model in our work, and
* Clerk to Justice John Paul Stevens, October Terms 1987 and 1988. Leonard F. Manning
Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.
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our life, every day. It is a tough but worthy task.
With warm wishes and best regards,
Abner Greene (Law Clerk OT 1987 and 1988)

***

Jamal Greene*
Dear Justice Stevens,
Babe Ruth, when asked to comment on the fact that his salary
was higher than President Hoover’s, reportedly said, “Why not? I
had a better year.”
As the carefully filled-in scorecard on the wall of your chambers
attests, Ruth’s life and yours once intersected. It was October 1,
1932, at Wrigley Field in Chicago, in the fifth inning of Game 3 of
the World Series between the Yankees and the Cubs. You, sitting in
the crowd behind the third base line, were just twelve years old. The
Bambino, at the plate, was in the winter of the greatest career the
game has ever known. As you tell it, Ruth pointed toward the center
field bleachers, and the rest was history.
Ruth’s comment about Hoover betrays a cockiness that was
every bit your opposite. But as I think back to my too-short year
walking past that scorecard every day, I think of your own scorecard,
and wonder whether you found some inspiration in that fleeting
moment.
I think of your 1975 opinion for a Seventh Circuit panel in
Fitzgerald v. Porter Memorial Hospital. In rejecting the claim of a
substantive due process right of a father to be present in the delivery
room of a public hospital, you expressed skepticism about framing
such a right in “privacy” terms. You reframed it as an “interest in
individual liberty that makes certain state intrusions on the citizen’s
* Clerk to Justice John Paul Stevens, October Term 2006. Associate Professor, Columbia
Law School.
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right to decide how he will live his own life intolerable.” You
repeated that view in your dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick, and Justice
Kennedy specifically endorsed that dissent when the Court
overturned Bowers in Lawrence v. Texas.
Then there’s the single day in 1989 on which the Court decided,
in Stanford v. Kentucky and Penry v. Lynaugh, that it was perfectly
constitutional for a state to execute juveniles and the mentally
retarded. You had written Thompson v. Oklahoma, barring the death
penalty for children under sixteen, the previous Term, and you
dissented in both Stanford and Penry. Thirteen years later you wrote
Atkins v. Virginia, overruling Penry, and three years after that you
joined Roper v. Simmons, overruling Stanford.
Most remarkable, perhaps, are two memos you drafted as a law
clerk to Justice Rutledge during the 1947 Term. As is now well
known, your memo in Ahrens v. Clark was heavily incorporated into
Justice Rutledge’s dissent, which argued that the presence of a
habeas petitioner in the territory of a federal district court was not a
jurisdictional requirement under the habeas statute. That dissent
became the law in Braden v. 30th Judicial Court of Kentucky, and it
formed the basis for your own opinion for the Court in Rasul v. Bush,
holding that the habeas statute extended to petitioners held at
Guantánamo Bay.
Earlier that Term, and less well known, you wrote a memo to
Justice Rutledge in Fisher v. Hurst. The petitioner, an African
American woman, was seeking to obtain a writ of mandamus to
compel the Oklahoma Supreme Court to comply with the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in Sipuel v. Board of Regents, requiring
the state to give her adequate access to a public legal education. You
advised Justice Rutledge to take judicial notice that “the doctrine of
segregation is itself a violation of the Constitutional requirement.”
The rest was history.
By my count that’s at least four called shots to one. I’ll say—
since you never would—that you had the better career.
Warmest wishes,
Jamal Greene
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Melissa Hart*
Reflecting on the year that I had the extraordinary fortune to
clerk for Justice John Paul Stevens (1996–1997), two moments stand
out for me as representative of the great empathy and respect for the
law that made him an exceptional Justice.
One of the things that surprised me about clerking on the
Supreme Court was the amount of time that law clerks spent on death
penalty work. Justice Stevens’ clerks spent slightly more time than
clerks in other chambers because he required us to write a memo on
every cert petition in a capital case. He reasoned that the cost of
missing an important question in just one of these petitions—the
death of a man who was improperly convicted or even actually
innocent—was so high that he wanted to be sure each petition was
given serious attention. Then there were the capital cases that the
Court heard on the merits—several in the year I clerked, including
one that came to the Court through a petition for stay of execution.
And for clerks in every chamber, there were a certain number of
nights in each month that we were responsible for staying at the
Court until a scheduled execution had occurred; our job was to be
ready in case a motion for a stay of execution came in. When they
did, we would review the claims, discuss the issues with the clerks in
other chambers, talk with our respective Justices and notify the Clerk
of the Court whether there were the necessary five votes to stay the
execution (there almost never were).
At that time, Justice Stevens had not yet concluded that the
death penalty was itself cruel and unusual punishment. We talked
about the issue frequently, and he was careful in this as in other
contexts to distinguish between what he might prefer as a matter of
policy and what he read the Constitution to require or to prohibit. He
did take very seriously arguments that particular methods of
execution might be impermissibly painful, that a man or woman
being put to death should have had all due process and effective
representation, and that there might be certain categories of crime, or
of perpetrator, where the death penalty would be inappropriate. So
when we received petitions for a stay of execution, they always
warranted careful evaluation.
* Clerk to Justice John Paul Stevens, October Term 1996. Associate Professor of Law,
Director of the Byron R. White Center, University of Colorado Law School.
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One night in late March 1997, I was the clerk responsible for
reviewing a last-minute stay request on an execution scheduled to
take place in Florida. On this particular night, Pedro Medina’s
lawyers asked the Supreme Court to stay his execution in light of
evidence that he might actually be innocent of the murder for which
he was convicted. Medina was a Cuban who had come to the United
States as part of the Mariel boatlift. In addition to the actualinnocence argument, his lawyers argued that he was so mentally ill
that execution was an inappropriate punishment. Though both
arguments had some significant support, the procedural intricacies of
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act posed
insurmountable barriers to Medina’s claims. Ultimately, the votes
needed to stay the execution were not there. Pedro Medina was
executed that night in Florida, in a process that made national news
as Florida’s “Old Sparky” malfunctioned. Witnesses to the event
described a twelve-inch crown of flames shooting out of Medina’s
head.
It was, frankly, a deeply troubling event to have played any part
in—even just the part of a law clerk evaluating the legal arguments
thousands of miles removed from either the underlying crime or the
execution. And when Justice Stevens came in to the office the next
morning, he knew that. He walked up to my desk, looked at me
gravely and said, “I am so sorry.”
I knew that his empathy for me was only one piece of what he
was expressing in those words. Without being self-important or overemotional, Justice Stevens had a sense of personal responsibility for
the decisions he took part in.
Eleven years later, in Baze v. Rees,11 Justice Stevens penned an
eloquent concurring opinion explaining that he had become
persuaded that “current decisions by state legislatures, by the
Congress of the United States, and by this Court to retain the death
penalty as a part of our law are the product of habit and inattention
rather than an acceptable deliberative process . . . .”12 His opinion
catalogs the many deep flaws in the justifications for and
administration of capital punishment in the United States. “I have
relied on my own experience in reaching the conclusion that the
11. 553 U.S. 35 (2008).
12. Id. at 78 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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imposition of the death penalty represents ‘the pointless and needless
extinction of life with only marginal contributions to any discernible
social or public purposes . . . .’”13
My experience was just one year of what Justice Stevens had
seen for almost thirty when he wrote his concurring opinion in Baze.
The careful years of thought, the accumulation of experience, the
empathy for victims and their families, for the families of those
executed, for the participants in the process of imposing death—to
have just one conversation with Justice Stevens about capital
punishment is to see the mind and heart of a man who carried the
responsibility of this question with care and a real sense of its
weight.
Despite his firm personal conviction that capital punishment was
a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishment, Justice Stevens’ decision in Baze was a
concurrence, not a dissent. He took precedent seriously and until a
majority of the Justices was willing to reconsider the
constitutionality of the death penalty, he treated the Court’s
precedent as binding.
This respect for the principles of stare decisis was just one part
of Justice Stevens’ larger, deep respect for the law. For me, one of
the interesting ways in which this respect was most evident was in a
real appreciation for the practice of law. Before he joined the
Seventh Circuit in 1970, Justice Stevens was a lawyer for more than
two decades. As a judge, he never forgot about being a lawyer.
The Supreme Court is often criticized for decisions that are
either ignorant about or indifferent to how law actually happens in
district courts or in the offices of attorneys advising their clients.
Justice Stevens was neither ignorant nor indifferent; instead he
always thought seriously about the consequences that Supreme Court
decisions would have for litigants and for their advocates. When we
talked about the cases the Court heard during the 1996 Term, he
often reflected on how a particular rule would operate in practice. He
enjoyed talking about the quality of the lawyering reflected in the
record, as well as the quality of the work being done by advocates in
front of the Supreme Court. And I will never forget the best career
advice I have ever received. Very near the end of the Term, Justice
13. Id. at 86 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 312 (White, J., concurring)).
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Stevens came into my office and cautioned me against going too
quickly into legal academia. “Go be a lawyer,” he said, with a smile.
As a teacher of Civil Procedure and Employment Discrimination
today, I often find myself talking with my students about opinions—
both majority and dissent—authored by Justice Stevens. I don’t
always agree with his outcome or his reasoning. But his sensitivity to
the consequences of the Court’s decisions is evident in nearly every
case. Justice Stevens had a remarkable ability to empathize—with his
clerks, with his colleagues (even when they disagreed), with the
lawyers and the parties in the cases he considered, and more
generally with the people who would feel the consequences of the
Court’s interpretation of the law.
Justice requires both empathy and respect for the law. John Paul
Stevens is a man who embodied those qualities of (a) Justice, and it
is an honor to participate in this tribute to him.

***

Amanda Leiter*
Dear Justice Stevens:
Many others have written about your contributions to the law,
including the law of workplace equality. I’m writing to you in your
capacity as an employer, to thank you for always and
unselfconsciously practicing what you preached.
When you first interviewed me for a clerkship, I was three
months pregnant. When I started the job about a year later, my son
was exactly six months old. Throughout that year, you regularly
asked me about him—you were interested in what he was learning to
do, who was watching him while I was at work, whether he had yet
learned to sleep through the night, to crawl, to walk, to say “mama.”
Late in the year, you asked him—then a toddler—to “help” you tie
your famous bowtie. He was welcome in the courthouse and even in
* Clerk to Justice John Paul Stevens, October Term 2003.
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your Chambers. He first learned to crawl up stairs by exploring, after
hours, the many marble staircases that connect the upper and lower
offices of your and the other Justices’ Chambers.
Your attitude toward my son was unfailingly warm. Yet equally
important, you never once suggested that I take a lighter load as the
only clerk (of four) with a child. You never asked whether I could
handle the workload in spite of my often sleepless nights. You never
suggested that I take on less than my fair share of the Court’s saddest
late-night work: waiting for and reviewing last-minute execution
appeals. Rather, you respected each of us enough to treat us all
equally, confident that whatever our individual obligations outside
the courthouse, we would find a way to give our work the time,
attention, and dedication it deserved.
You showed that same generosity of spirit in the summer of
2009, when I was home with my second baby, and you called to ask
whether I’d enjoy arguing a case before the Court. You asked about
the baby, a little girl. You even noted that the timing was imperfect
for me to take on such a significant project. But the very fact of your
call made clear to me that you expected I could handle the challenge.
And your belief in me gave me the courage and confidence to do just
that.
I will always be grateful to you for giving me these
opportunities, and for expecting me, and everyone you hired, to
perform up to our best abilities. You taught me, by example, that the
essence of workplace equality is employer respect. I know that all of
your former employees learned that lesson from you, and we all feel
the consequent obligation: not just to rise to the career challenges
that confront us, but also, more important, to embrace our
employees’ differences, and then to expect the most from each of
them, regardless of those differences.
Thank you, now and always,
Amanda Leiter

836

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:813

Gregory P. Magarian*
Supreme Court Justices leave behind formidable written records
on which we can fixate. We inevitably lose sight, however, of the
human beings who wrote the opinions—their personalities, their
physical presences, how they dealt with other people. Because very
few people ever see the Justices do or even discuss their work, the
passage of time exacts an especially heavy cost in lost insights.
Justice John Paul Stevens is too modest, and too dedicated to the
ideal of impartial, analytically rigorous judging, to overestimate how
much he and his colleagues cast the law in their own images. Even
so, I think he would acknowledge that a Justice’s personal qualities
necessarily influence his or her judicial writings. Justice Stevens’
voluminous body of opinions documents his deep commitments to
such crucial principles as inclusive public discourse, the separation
of church and state, and equal opportunity regardless of race or
gender. Having had the honor and pleasure of working under the
Justice for a year that passed too quickly, too long ago (OT 1994), I
want to share a few subjective impressions of the man—one who
played a pivotal role in guiding our law from the twentieth century
into the twenty-first.
Justice Stevens moves and speaks with a tranquil aspect, never
in a rush, always with purpose. He has a way of making any person
with whom he is talking—even a socially awkward recent law school
graduate who has just stumbled into his chambers for a clerkship
interview—feel immediately at ease. By all accounts he can be very
intense, especially on the tennis court or the golf course, and I
certainly have seen him animated. But during the year I spent in his
chambers, I never saw him agitated or upset. Even when he returned
from conferences with deep concerns about some of his colleagues’
positions or arguments, or had to stare down the clock on an
especially wrenching execution night, he remained calm, selfpossessed, seemingly at peace. He never did or said anything that
projected egotism (except for the occasional gleeful report of a
victory at tennis), but he radiated the kind of quiet confidence that
made the people around him feel secure and capable of doing their
best work. I have never met anyone with a comparable aura of
* Clerk to Justice John Paul Stevens, October Term 1994. Professor of Law, Washington
University.
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gravitas that had less to do with any conscious effort to project
gravitas. The Justice is a private person, in the sense that he does not
readily talk about his personal life or probe into the personal lives of
the people around him, but his manner is warm, welcoming, and
friendly. His laughter, like his speech, flows easily, gently, and
always sincerely. At some point in his life, he must have borne
someone an ill thought or even let loose with a harsh word—but I
cannot imagine how a harsh word from him would sound.
Justice Stevens genuinely seemed to enjoy talking with his
clerks. Before each argument session he gathered us around him on
the comfortable chairs in our office space to discuss the upcoming
cases. He struck a thoughtful tone in those discussions, even as to
cases about which he presumably had strong views, I think because
he believed his job at that stage in the process was to ponder rather
than to declare. He listened to our earnest briefings with far closer
attention than his wealth of legal knowledge made necessary. After
the Court’s conferences he would reconvene us in the same spot. He
engrossed and delighted us by sharing his detailed impressions about
the votes and comments of the Justices, and he used these talks to
educate us about his initial strategies for assigning opinions or
drafting them himself. That he had before 1994 developed a
reputation as a sort of quirky iconoclast on the Court seems
incredible in retrospect; that year, his first as the senior “liberal”
Justice, immediately revealed him as an adept and creative tactician.
He liked the new responsibility. My co-clerks and I well remember
his sly smile when he told us, early in the Term, that he would keep
an interesting First Amendment majority opinion for himself.
Justice Stevens famously wrote his own first drafts, and more
importantly he carefully planned and instructed us on his reasoning
and rhetoric, but he gave us room to contribute—subject to careful
review. I will never forget the day that, out of some combination of
hubris and frustration, I made additions to the end of a draft dissent,
putting an outrageous position in the Justice’s mouth. After reading
the draft, he walked into the clerks’ office with his usual even gait,
and told me, with no trace of anger or impatience: “This looks good,
but I think I’d like to make a few changes in the last section.”
I have never heard Justice Stevens declaim loudly, or quietly,
about any of the deep values that animated his jurisprudence. He let
his opinions do the vocal work, and he honored his commitments to
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justice and fairness simply by treating the people around him—
litigants, his colleagues, his staff—justly and fairly. When he has
spoken out publicly about issues that matter to him, such as capital
punishment, his tone has tended toward the analytical rather than the
polemical. I think this sense of reserve and decorum has helped him
to muster both the energy and the moral authority that he has
sustained over a lifetime of public service. No young lawyer could
hope for a better role model.

***

Adam M. Samaha*
One day, early in my clerkship with Justice Stevens, I went into
his office to discuss something or other. I no longer recall the subject
of our conversation. But I do remember that we began discussing a
judicial opinion that Justice Stevens wanted to review. “Let me pull
it up on Westlaw,” he said, turning to his computer. And I thought to
myself, “Alright, he knows about Westlaw. Impressive technology
awareness for someone from his generation.” Then he said, “Now let
me get rid of the headnotes.” And I thought to myself, “Wait a
minute, you can get rid of the headnotes on Westlaw?” I spent the
rest of my clerkship trying to catch up with Justice Stevens,
technologically and otherwise.
Thankfully, Justice Stevens did not make it artificially easy to
catch up with him. He set a vigorous intellectual pace even as he
demonstrated civility, good humor, and ease with the burdens of
judgment. This made his chambers a remarkable learning
environment. The work was not easy, of course, and I faced a
personal challenge. I have a neuromuscular disability called dystonia,
which is in some ways unsightly and which interferes with the
accomplishment of many simple physical tasks. But technology—as
Justice Stevens well understood—is an equalizer for people with
* Clerk to Justice John Paul Stevens, October Term 1998. Professor of Law, The
University of Chicago Law School.
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disabilities. And I was quietly encouraged by Justice Stevens’
confidence in my ability to serve, along with a casual remark that he
made one day.
When my disability attracted a journalist’s attention, Justice
Stevens was asked to comment and he released a statement: “I will
simply tell you that I applied the same standards in hiring my three
current clerks that I have always employed and that their work so far
this term has confirmed my judgment that they were the best
qualified candidates available when I hired them.” I was grateful for
that message. We briefly discussed the situation in his chambers. “To
tell you the truth,” he said, referring to my disability, “you don’t
really notice it after a while.” I was grateful for that, too.
I suppose that all of us want to be treated as unique individuals
sometimes—with special talents, interests, even faults. But there are
occasions when it is best to be seen as an undifferentiated member of
a team—with potentially distinguishing features stripped away like a
distracting headnote. As a judge, Justice Stevens demonstrated a
special ability to concentrate on what mattered, to put aside what did
not, and to provide a model of intellectual engagement and respect
for everyone else. The Nation has never had a finer judge. It was an
honor to work for him and to learn from him.

***

Samuel Spital*
Dear Justice Stevens,
This letter is difficult to write. You taught me more about law,
and about life, than I can begin to describe here. I decided to focus
on just one of your many remarkable qualities: your modesty.
In light of the central, but complex, role of unelected, lifetenured Article III judges in our democratic society, modesty is oftinvoked as an essential judicial virtue—although even the best jurists
* Clerk to Justice John Paul Stevens, October Term 2005.
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sometimes disagree about what that means in practice. I believe you
represent judicial modesty at its finest.
In their statements upon your retirement, Justice Scalia twice
referred to your brilliance, and Justice Alito noted that you “will
surely be remembered as one of the most important Justices to serve
on the Court.” I do not think it is an exaggeration to say that you are
widely recognized as among the greatest legal minds in our nation’s
history. Yet, when deciding cases before the Court, your intellect did
not close your mind or distract you from your role as a judge. You
never thought you knew it all in advance. Rather, you carefully
considered the relevant facts and legal authorities, as well as the
points made by your colleagues, the court below, counsel, and your
clerks, before making your final decision.
Even after reaching your considered judgment in a case, your
modesty remained. When the majority of the Court disagreed with
you, you applied the principles of stare decisis seriously and fairly in
the next case. And you never invalidated a state or federal statute
because you believed it was bad public policy. This is not to say that
you confused modesty with abdication of your independence or
judicial responsibility. You did not substitute your views for those of
legislative bodies in matters of policy, but you were vigilant in
protecting federal constitutional rights. You applied the Court’s
precedent fairly but not blindly: when there was a special
justification for declining to adhere to a prior decision, you would
not do so.
Your modesty not only made you a better jurist, it made you a
more influential one. In a substantial number of cases, you convinced
your colleagues that a prior case had been wrongly decided, and your
dissenting position later became the holding of the Court. I believe
this was, in part, due to the modesty of your dissents. Careful not to
overstate the majority’s reasoning or holding, you cared about
analysis, not rhetoric. You once explained to me that an argument I
proposed adding to a dissent was not helpful because it showed only
that the majority was wrong, not that we were right. You taught me
that modest writing is more persuasive writing (and not only because
briefs and opinions sound stronger without extraneous adverbs).
You are modest not only as a Justice, but as an employer and
mentor. I wish those who view judges as elitist or out-of-touch could
spend time with you so they could see how down-to-earth,
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considerate, and kind you are.
Some of the most special memories I have from clerking for you
are the stories you shared about your clerkship with Justice Rutledge.
I know I speak for my fellow clerks when I say that you have
inspired us every bit as much as he inspired you.
Samuel Spital
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